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1. Introduction
Recently, threats of financial collapse and global recession, food shortages, and rising food
prices have exacerbated economic vulnerability to adverse shocks1. One consequence has been
the increased presence of food insecurity even in countries unaffected by recurrent famine and the
issue is now perceived to be part of broader social protection strategies (Gentilini, 2007; Crawford
et al., 2010). A number of inquiries show that the relationship between food intake and nutri-
tional achievement can vary greatly depending, amongst other things, on the level of access to
complementary inputs: healthcare, basic education, clean drinking water, sanitation and so on
(Dreze and Sen, 1989). These analyses support a pragmatic approach to promoting capabilities
and incentives, one that tackles hunger and food insecurity by bridging food assistance and other
pillars of social protection (Crawford et al., 2010). In accordance with this perspective, new social
protection measures have been implemented in numerous underdeveloped and emerging countries
(Duflo, 2012).
Social protection programmes targeting the poor, or those who may become poor as a result of
adverse shocks, can take many forms: cash transfer (CT) schemes involving welfare payments, child
allowances or pensions; in-kind transfers such as food aid or school food programmes; subsidies
for goods purchased by the poor; unemployment insurance, and public works or workfare schemes.
The ’new social protection agenda’ includes interventions that link the recipients of cash or food
payments to other government services and conditional cash transfer (CCT) schemes (Hoddinott,
2012). These programmes provide cash payments to poor households that meet certain behavioural
requirements, generally related to children’s healthcare, child nutrition and education, with the aim
of promoting longer-term human capital investments (Fiszbein et al., 2009).
Despite the abundance of social protection innovations and studies assessing their effectiveness,
the literature still lacks inquiries that rigorously measure the effects of such innovations in sub-
Saharan Africa (Gilligan et al., 2009)2. This paper partially fills this gap by evaluating the effects
of specific social protection programmes (i.e. CTs) introduced in the past 20 years on food security
1Following the food and economic crises, in 2009 more than a billion people worldwide were undernourished (FAO,
2011). The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that in 2010-12 period, about 870 million people
were undernourished (FAO, 2012).
2An exception is Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Nets Programme (PSNP), the largest social protection programme
in sub-Saharan Africa. The PSNP has been rigorously evaluated across a range of indicators by Gilligan et al. (2009)
and Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux (2011), amongst others.
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in sub-Saharan Africa (Grosh et al., 2008; Garcia and Moore, 2012). These programmes, which
constitute the dominant form of social transfer in this region, can be provided as alternatives or
complements to vouchers or traditional food transfer programmes3, deal with short-term poverty
by providing guaranteed extra money and serve as insurance against the risk of food insecurity 4.
This paper makes two major contributions. First and foremost, we determine whether CT has
positive shifts in alleviating food insecurity, an interesting exercise because of the nature of our
sample countries. The extreme poverty and pervasiveness of hunger in sub-Saharan Africa opens
to question certain facts that are taken for granted in other parts of the world, particularly the
responses to welfare transfers in terms of individual or household behaviour.
Second, we use the synthetic control method (Abadie et al., 2010) to evaluate food security
policy interventions. As our data were collected primarily for evaluation of CTs’ effects on the
proportion of the population suffering chronic undernourishment, we were able to estimate the
extent to which the trajectory defined by the synthetic control estimator predicts changes in that
proportion, as implied by the quasi-experimental setting. Because the latter can be estimated
with some degree of confidence given the existence of similar countries that are not subject to
CTs, we can use these results to measure the effects of the policy intervention in question. Note
that identification of the specific country features we estimate in predicting how undernourishment
status changes with policy implementation, may or may not confirm the channel through which
the intervention operates.
Our results suggest that CT programmes have differing effects on the countries in our sample
and, in some cases, reduce food insecurity significantly. In particular, although the results are mixed
for countries in the upper-middle income bracket because we were unable to identify exogenous
variations in CTs, the effects of these programmes appear to be important when applied in low-
income and fragile countries in sub-Saharan Africa. For example, the reduction in the prevalence
of undernourishment averaged over three years ranges from 0.5 to 2 percentage points in Ethiopia,
Mali, Malawi, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe, whilst food insecurity was largely reduced in Rwanda
consequent to the CT programme launched in 2005 (3.96 percentage points). In most of the cases
3For a discussion of alternative food assistance policy tools, see Gentilini and Omamo (2011).
4CTs are also linked to improvements in human capital because most of the money is spent on more and better
food and on child education, health, and nutrition, thus reducing the intergenerational transmission of poverty
(Hanlon et al., 2010; Devereux, 2012), although they are susceptible to price inflation Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux
(2010).
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considered here, CTs were part of the humanitarian response to an emergency and thus the flow of
money to a large part of the (poor) population had immediate effects on food purchases, given the
high degree of food income elasticity. The soundness of these results were tested through placebo
experiments using countries that were not subjected to CTs, applying the same synthetic control
estimator used for those that were so subjected.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we discuss methodological
issues and present the data. In Section 3 we provide the results of our empirical analysis, discuss
the main results and draw the relevant policy implications. Section 4 concludes the paper by
summarising the key issues.
2. Data and evaluation methodology
Our empirical analysis is based on a dataset covering 48 sub-Saharan African countries for the
1992-2010 period. The length of the sample period is strongly influenced by data availability and
our aim of evaluating the effects of CTs in this region. Here, we present the main variables of
interest for our analysis.
The outcome variable, which we use as a measure of food insecurity, is the prevalence of
undernourishment (PU) and is based on the proportion of the population subject to chronic un-
dernourishment5. This measure indicates individuals whose dietary energy supply is below the
minimum level necessary to maintain health and carry out light physical activities. It proxies the
availability and access dimensions of food security at the country level, and is extracted from the
Food Security Indicators redacted yearly by the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO).
Despite the wide adoption of this indicator in food security analyses, a number of questions
arise in its use. Dasgupta (1993) and Svedberg (2002) discuss this indicator critically and argue
that reliance on it may result in a significant underestimation of global undernutrition6. Such an
argument is also advanced by Masset (2011) whose criticism relies on the lack of robustness of the
5See Masset (2011) for a review of hunger indices and methodological issues.
6With regard to content, the indicator’s reliance on the distribution of the country’s average annual per capita
food consumption means that short-term phenomena such as seasonal crises are not covered. Further, the indicator
is not intended to capture the evolution in the fundamental elements that drive the long-term nutrition condition
in a country. In addition, chronic hunger is not the only interesting phenomenon that needs to be monitored. The
evolution in food production, prevailing dietary composition and ratio of food expenditure to other basic needs
expenditures such as health services and education may be equally important in monitoring the state of food security
and the role that agricultural and food policies play therein (Cavatorta and Pieroni, 2013).
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parameters used in the indicator’s calculation; in particular, energy cut-off points, food availability
and the distribution of calories across households.
The FAO indicator of chronic hunger, in contrast, has the undeniable merit of having raised
and kept high awareness of the broader malnutrition problem. Cafiero and Gennari (2011) suggest
that this indicator provides evidence that not enough is being done to monitor this problem. Thus,
if the aim is to assess the country-level changes in chronic hunger affected by one specific policy
(e.g. CT), the limited reliability of the FAO’s PU indicator is not likely to influence significantly its
patterns because it can be detached during estimation by including country fixed effects or specific
control variables that are linked with its multidimensional framework.
From the same data source (Food Security Indicators), we extract four additional variables,
which we use as covariates in the evaluation procedure: the access to improved water sources
(AW), access to improved sanitation facilities (AS), the cereal import dependency ratio (CID),
and the political stability and absence of violence/terrorism index (PSV). Whilst AW and AS
reduce the risks of diarrhoea and other diseases that hamper the capacity to convert food into
good nutritional outcomes, the CID and PSV have direct effects on a country’s probability of
experiencing undernourishment (Dreze and Sen, 1989; Smith, 2000; Masset, 2011; UNDP, 2012).
In more detail, AW is measured as the percentage of the population with reasonable access to
an adequate amount of water from an improved source, such as a household connection, public
standpipe, borehole or protected well or spring or rainwater collection. Reasonable access is defined
as the availability of at least 20 litres per person per day from a source within one kilometre of
the individual’s dwelling. AS refers to the percentage of the population with at least adequate
access to excreta disposal facilities that can effectively prevent human, animal and insect contact
with excreta. Improved facilities range from simple, but protected, pit latrines to flush toilets
with a sewerage connection. To be effective, these facilities must be correctly constructed and
properly maintained. CID is the sum of imports and production minus exports by region and
sub-region. When the international prices of primary commodities start to rise, highly import-
dependent countries are likely to suffer, with a consequent increase in food insecurity. Finally, the
PSV index represents the underlying institutional determinants of food availability. This index
measures perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilised or overthrown by
unconstitutional or violent means, including politically motivated violence and terrorism. We use
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an indicator produced by the Brookings Institution and World Bank Development Research Group,
which reflects the statistical compilation of survey responses given by a large number of enterprises,
citizens and experts in industrial and developing countries, as reported by several survey institutes,
think tanks and non-governmental and international organisations. The PSV index varies from
approximately -2.5 (weak stability) to 2.5 (strong stability), with an improvement in governance
indicating increased food security.
In addition, data on two variables are collected from the World Bank’s African Development
Indicators. Our variables of interest are the percentage of female pupils at the primary level,
including enrolments in public and private schools, and the annual growth rate of per-capita GDP.
A discussion of the importance of per-capita GDP for summarising a country’s economic condition
is omitted to save space. The positive relationship between female education and food security is
well documented in the development literature (Behrman and Wolfe, 1987; Kassouf and Senauer,
1996; Burchi and Muro, 2012). Educated women ensure good nutritional outcomes for their families
through their capability to make use of information on good health and nutritional practices.
2.1. Synthetic control approach
In evaluating the effects of CTs on food insecurity, it is necessary to compare countries that have
and have not experienced these transfers. The challenge is to find countries that are sufficiently
similar in the sub-Saharan Africa to ensure that any differences in food security outcomes reflect
the policy intervention rather than disparities in country characteristics. We follow Abadie and
Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010, 2012) who propose a method based on the synthetic
control approach. In this approach, a weighted combination of potential control countries (the
synthetic control) is constructed to approximate the most relevant characteristics linked with the
food insecurity indicator of the treated countries. Schematically, when a CT is introduced, the
synthetic control method estimates the PU changes by comparing the observable outcome trends
with those estimated in countries undergoing no policy intervention.
More formally, given a sample of sub-Saharan African countries indexed by J , we can distinguish
between a set of J1 countries that have introduced a CT policy (treated countries) and a set of
J0 countries that are potential controls for comparison, such that that J = J0 + J1. Following
Abadie et al. (2012), we define the potential comparison controls the ”donor pool”7 and suppose
7The donor pool is defined as a reservoir of potential comparison units.
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that the characteristics of each treated unit may be better approximated by a weighted average
of countries in the donor pool. It is also assumed that the sample is a balanced panel for the
time span t = 1, ...., T and includes a number of pre-intervention periods T0 and post-intervention
periods T1, such that T = T0 + T1. The synthetic control can then be represented by a vector
(J0 × 1) of weights W = w1, ..., wJ0 , with 0 ≤ wJ0 ≤ 1 and w1 + ... + wJ0 = 1, where W is chosen
to better reassemble the characteristics of the treated units in the synthetic control (Abadie and
Gardeazabal, 2003).
We define Xj1 as a (k× 1) vector containing the pre-intervention characteristics of one treated
unit j1 in the set of treated unites J1, and XJ0 as a (k × J0) matrix of the pre-intervention
characteristics of the donor pool. Our intent is to find a set of W ∗ that minimises the distance∑k
m=1 vm (Xj1m −XJ0mW )2, where m = 1, ..., k and vm is a weight that reflects the relative impor-
tance assigned to the m− th variable when we measure the discrepancy between Xj1 and XJ0W .
Introducing synthetic control weights vm, we can describe the relevance of the explanatory variable
chosen to measure the synthetic control. Indeed, as Abadie et al. (2012) show, we can infer the
goodness of the chosen variables by comparing the synthetic control values of each k variable with
their simple mean in the donor pool.
We now focus on Y1, one vector (T1×1) of the outcome of unit j1 in set J1 in post-intervention
period T1, that is, Y1 = (Yj1T0+1, ..., Yj1T )
′. Symmetrically, we define Y0 as a matrix (T1 × J0)
containing all of the post-intervention characteristics of the countries in the donor pool. The
synthetic control estimator for the countries that experienced CTs in the given period is expressed
as the difference between Y1 − Y0W ∗. Hence, for a given post-intervention period t > T0, the
synthetic control estimator for a treated unit j is Yj1t −
∑
J0
w∗YJot. Matching variables Xj1
and XJ0 are supposed to be the predictors of post-intervention outcomes, which are themselves
unaffected by the intervention. Abadie et al. (2010) propose a linear factor model to estimate
Y1 − Y0W ∗, to reduce both the number of unmeasured factors affecting the outcome variables and
the heterogeneity in the effects of observed and unobserved factors.
Controlling for unobservable factors ideally requires a large pre-intervention time span T0.
However, when PU is used as the outcome variable, trade-offs may arise between the length of the
time span and the PU indicator’s performance. As clarified in the previous section, the temporal
behaviour of food insecurity is highly volatile and depends on a series of shocks, such as epidemics
7
or natural disasters or distractions arising from armed conflicts, which can permanently modify the
behaviour of that series. In addition, to evaluate the effects of CT policies, we need to find a period
of time in which no other policies have been implemented specifically to reduce food insecurity. As
a consequence, an ad hoc sufficiently long time span is proposed for each treated country.
We perform a placebo test for each CT intervention on the food insecurity indicator to confirm
the goodness of our estimated results. We replicate the synthetic control estimate of each treated
unit for each country in the donor pool. In other words, for a given country in subset J0 that
does not implement a CT policy at time t > T0, we expect an unusually large gap in relation to
the respective treated country. If we do obtain this result, our interpretation is that the analysis
provides significant evidence that CTs reduce PU. If the placebo tests produce gaps similar to
those for the treated countries, in contrast, then our interpretation is that the analysis does not
constitute evidence of a significant CT impact on PU.
2.2. Case study selection
A preliminary step in the synthetic control method is to identify feasible treated units and the
donor pool. The upper part of Table 1 lists countries that introduced CT policies (treated units) in
the sample period, whilst the bottom part lists the donor pool countries. The last column of Table
1 shows the sub-Saharan African countries by income class following the World Bank classification
(Garcia and Moore, 2012). This classification allows us to distinguish CTs implemented in upper-
middle income countries from those offered to low-income and fragile state countries.
Middle-income CTs often take the form of cash grant programmes planned for the long term.
They are usually managed by government institutions and are domestically funded. These CT
programmes are stable in nature and target social protection, without any specificity to food
insecurity, and are addressed to vulnerable groups such as the elderly.
Conversely, low-income and fragile state countries implement CTs that are often designed to
combat food insecurity within a relatively short time frame. They are typically non-government
programmes that are partially or fully funded by donors. Because they are not centrally admin-
istered, the management information systems of these programmes are usually ad hoc in nature.
They are generally emergency responses to natural disasters or man-made events, and they are not
linked to other programmes.
For the inclusion in the set of treated units, a country had to satisfy two narrow and necessary
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Table 1: Cash transfer policies in sub-Saharan Africa
Country code Country name Treatment date Income group
Treated units
LSO Lesotho∗ 2005, (2009) Upper-middle income
SWZ Swaziland 2005 Upper-middle income
BFA Burkina Faso 2008 Low income
ETH Ethiopia 2005 Low-income
GHA Ghana 2008 Low-income
MLI Mali 2000-2007 Low-income
MWI Malawi 2005 Low-income
NER Niger 2008 Low-income
RWA Rwanda 2006 Low-income
SLE Sierra Leone 2005 Fragile state
ZWE Zimbabwe 2004 Fragile state
Donor pool countries
AGO Angola Upper-middle income
CMR Cameroon Upper-middle income
GAB Gabon Upper-middle income
GNQ Equatorial Guinea Upper-middle income
MUS Mauritius Upper-middle income
SYC Seychelles Upper-middle income
COM Comoros Low-income
GIN Guinea Low-income
MDG Madagascar Low-income
MRT Mauritania Low-income
TCD Chad Low-income
UGA Uganda Low-income
BDI Burundi Fragile state
CIV Ivory Coast Fragile state
COG Republic of Congo Fragile state
LBR Liberia Fragile state
SDN Sudan Fragile state
SOM Somalia Fragile state
STP Sao Tome and Principe Fragile state
TGO Togo Fragile state
Countries excluded in line with treatment requirements
BWA Botswana 1996, 2002 Upper-middle income
CPV Cape Verde 1992, 1995 Upper-middle income
NAM Namibia 2000 Upper-middle income
NGA Nigeria 2008, 2009 Upper-middle income
SEN Senegal 2009, 2010 Upper-middle income
ZAF South Africa 1990 Upper-middle income
KEN Kenya 2005, 2009 Low-income
MOZ Mozambique 1993 Low-income
TZA Tanzania 2010 Low-income
ZMB Zambia 2004,2006, 2007,2008 Low-income
ZAR Dem. Rep. of Congo 2004 Fragile state
ERI Eritrea 2009 Fragile state
Countries excluded in line with donor pool requirements
BEN Benin Low-income
DJI Djibouti Low-income
GMB Gambia Low-income
GNB Guinea-Bissau Low-income
CAF Central African Republic Fragile state
Notes: The income classification of the 48 sub-Saharan African countries presented in the third column,
follows the World Bank classification Garcia and Moore (2012). The asterisk for Lesotho describes the
post-intervention constraint (2009 in parenthesis).
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conditions: i) its CT policy had to be implemented after 1996, with a minimum of pre-intervention
periods, T0 = 5 and ii) only one CT policy was implemented. The latter condition was adopted
to allow identification of the interventions effects. Following application of these conditions, we
excluded Botswana, Cape Verde, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Kenya, Mozambique and Zambia
from the treatment sample. In addition, Tanzania and Eritrea were excluded because there was
an insufficient post-intervention time period for these two countries. The Democratic Republic
of Congo and Namibia were excluded because of missing data. The final treatment sample thus
comprises 11 countries.
Note that in the majority of the upper-middle income countries more than one CT policy was
implemented, thus violating condition ii). This condition restricts our analysis to Lesotho and
Swaziland, meaning that we could examine CTs’ effects on PU only at the country level for this
income group.
The donor pool was also chosen to satisfy two main requirements: i) the countries therein had
not experienced a CT policy or ii) any other policy with indirect effects on food insecurity. Twenty
countries met both requirements and thus formed the donor pool after excluding 12 countries that
did not meet the first requirement in the 1990-2010 period and we excluded 5 countries (Benin,
Central African Republic, Djibouti, Gambia and Guinea-Bissau) that did not meet the second.
The interventions that had important food security implications for these five excluded coun-
tries were: i) the Emergency Food Security Support Project (EFSSP) implemented in 2008 by the
government of Benin and the World Bank (World Bank, 2008b) to assist the population experi-
encing food insecurity following a food price crisis; ii) a poverty reduction strategy launched in
Djibouti in 2004 by the National Food Security Council (World Bank, 2012); iii) a well-structured
programme designed to increase household and national food security through improved agricul-
tural productivity, production and producers income introduced by the government of Gambia
in 2004 (Republic of Gambia, 2005); iv) the EFSSP promoted by the World Bank in Guinea-
Bissau in 2008 to rescue the food-insecure population following a food price crisis; and v) several
programmes to combat food insecurity launched by international agencies in the Central African
Republic, where about 45% of the population was living in conditions of food insecurity following
the end of the country’s civil war in 2005 World Bank (2008a); Global Food Security (2009).
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3. Empirical results
3.1. Estimates
As previously explained, we constructed a synthetic estimator for each country as the convex
combination of characteristics in the donor pool that most resembled the matching treated country
in terms of the undernourishment predictor.
Table 2 displays the statistical results of a comparison between the pre-treatment characteristics
of the actual treated countries and those of the synthetic control estimators, in addition to the
average of the countries in the donor pool. It should first be noted that the mean estimators of
the countries that did not implement a CT programme during our sample period do not appear to
provide suitable information as a control group. Conversely, in almost all of the treated countries
under investigation, there is a large gap in the pre-treatment covariate means relative to the
synthetic estimators. The results in Table 2 highlight the affinity between a country exposed to
the CT programme and its synthetic counterpart, similarly to matching estimator, safeguarding
against estimation of extreme counterfactuals (King and Zeng, 2006).
The model is constructed by choosing the weight w∗, which minimises the mean squared pre-
diction error (RMSPE) of PU in each treated country during the pre-CT period8. The last lines
in Table 2 confirms that the degree of RMSPE is small, except in the case of Ghana and Niger.
Thus, whilst the choice of pre-treatment covariates fits well in general, we suspect that other pre-
treatment influences may have affected PU in these two countries. Table 3 displays the weights
of each control country across the synthetic estimates. These weights indicate, for example, that
the PU trend in Lesotho prior to CT programme implementation is best represented by the com-
bination of Gabon (0.657), Republic of Congo (0.107) and six other countries for its complement
(0.235), whilst the other countries in the donor pool have W − weight = 0. We extend this inter-
pretation in creating the counterfactual samples for all of the columns in Table 3, which represent
the weight of estimates in countries subjected to a CT programme.
Figure 1 shows the PU trends in the treated countries (solid line) and synthetic control samples
(dotted line) during the 1992-2010 period. Figure 2 reports the results of the placebo tests. We
8The RMSPE measures the lack of fit between the path of the outcome variable (PU) in each country
and its synthetic counterpart. The pre-intervention RMSPE for a given country is defined as RMSPE =(
1/T0
∑T0
t=1
(
Y1t −∑J0 w∗YJot)2)1/2.
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Figure 1: Cash transfer policies and food insecurity
(a) Lesotho (b) Swaziland
(c) Burkina Faso (d) Ethiopia
(e) Ghana (f) Mali
Notes: The solid line shows the real behaviour of the PU variable, whereas the dotted line is the synthetic control. The covariates used for the
synthetic controls are reported in Table 2 and the country weights in Table 3.
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Cash transfer policies and food insecurity (continued)
(g) Malawi (h) Niger
(i) Rwanda (j) Sierra Leone
(k) Zimbabwe
Notes: The solid line shows the real behaviour of the PU variable, whereas the dotted line is the synthetic control. The covariates used for the
synthetic controls are reported in Table 2 and the country weights in Table 3.
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Table 3: Comparison countries for each selected treatment unit
Lesotho Swaziland Burkina Ethiopia Ghana Mali Malawi Niger Rwanda Sierra Zimbabwe
Faso Leone
Angola 0.000 0.013 0.040 0.434 0.000 0.249 0.000 0.000 0.064 0.000 0.000
Burundi 0.000 0.000 0.159 0.151 0.000 0.000 0.350 0.000 0.134 0.000 0.379
Benin 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Ivory Coast 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cameroon 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.385
Republic of Congo 0.107 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Comoros 0.097 0.107 0.000 0.380 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.310 0.273 0.029
Gabon 0.658 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.514 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Guinea 0.000 0.000 0.801 0.000 0.170 0.000 0.000 0.630 0.000 0.000 0.000
Liberia 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Madagascar 0.064 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.025 0.252 0.105 0.713 0.117
Mauritania 0.001 0.539 0.000 0.000 0.137 0.554 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.000
Mauritius 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.096 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sao Tome and Principe 0.001 0.340 0.000 0.000 0.663 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Togo 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.118 0.000 0.000 0.000
Uganda 0.041 0.000 0.000 0.035 0.000 0.198 0.000 0.000 0.383 0.000 0.091
Notes: Countries and W −Weights for synthetic controls constructed from the best fitting combination of countries.
present the results of two placebo tests that include all of the countries in the donor pool and a
selection of those countries with a RMSPE less than three times that of the treated countries
(Abadie et al., 2012).
We first consider the two upper-medium income countries, Lesotho and Swaziland, both of
which introduced CTs in 2005 (Figure 1: panels a and b). The prevalence of undernourishment
in the synthetic Lesotho closely tracks the trajectory of this variable in the pre-treatment period
(panel a). Along with the previous estimates of the pre-treatment covariates, the synthetic Lesotho
thus provides an approximation of the PU that would have been recorded in Lesotho after 2005
in the absence of any CT. Note that the real PU trend shows no change in trajectory following
policy implementation. As a consequence, we can conclude that CTs have not improved food
security in Lesotho. Applying the same line of reasoning to the case of Swaziland, we find that
immediately after CTs introduction, the country’s real trend diverged from the trajectory of its
synthetic control in an unexpected direction, i.e. there was an increase in food insecurity9. We
confirmed these results with the placebo tests reported in Figure 2 (panel a and b)10.
A different picture emerges for the low-income and fragile state countries. Panels (c) to (h) of
Figure 1 show the main outcomes of analysis of the low-income group. Whilst PU in the synthetic
Rwanda, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Mali and Malawi displayed a primarily upward trend, the real
9In the case of Lesotho, we stopped our analysis before 2009 when a second CT programme, the Child Grants
Programme, was introduced.
10For Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe, we omitted the second placebo test, as we consider only those countries
for which the RMSPE was less than three times that of the treated country.
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Figure 2: Placebo tests
(a) Lesotho placebo test I (b) Swaziland placebo test I
(c) Burkina Faso placebo test I (d) Burkina Faso placebo test II
(e) Ethiopia placebo test I (f) Ethiopia placebo test II
Notes: The black line is the difference between each treated country and its synthetic control, whereas the gray lines are the differences between
the treated countryies potential controls and their synthetic controls in the placebo tests. The results of two different placebo tests are reported:
i) with the entire donor pool, ii) with a redistricted set of countries in the donor pool in which the RMSPE is no more than three times higher
than that of the treated country. Because the RMSPE for Lesotho and Swaziland is alway three times less than that for the other countries in
the donor pool, we report only the first placebo test for these two countries.
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Placebo tests (continued)
(g) Ghana placebo test I (h) Ghana placebo test II
(i) Mali placebo test I (j) Mali placebo test I
(k) Malawi placebo test I (l) Malawi placebo test II
Notes: The black line is the difference between each treated country and its synthetic control, whereas the gray lines are the differences between
the treated countries potential controls and their synthetic controls in the placebo tests. The results of two different placebo tests are reported:
i) with the entire donor pool, ii) with a redistricted set of countries in the donor pool in which the RMSPE is no more than three times higher
than that of the treated country.
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Placebo tests (continued)
(m) Niger placebo test I (n) Niger placebo test II
(o) Rwanda placebo test I (p) Rwanda placebo test II
(q) Sierra Leone placebo test I (r) Sierra Leone placebo test II
(s) Zimbabwe placebo test I
Notes: The black line is the difference between each treated country and its synthetic control, whereas the gray lines are the differences between
the treated countries potential controls and their synthetic controls in the placebo tests. The results of two different placebo tests are reported:
i) with the entire donor pool, ii) with a redistricted set of countries in the donor pool in which the RMSPE is no more than three times higher
than that of the treated country. Because the RMSPE for Zimbabwe is alway three times less than that for the other countries in the donor pool,
we report only the first placebo test for this country.
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PU trend in these countries underwent a sharp decline immediately after CT policy intervention.
The difference between the two trajectories in subsequent years suggests a large improvement in
food security outcomes.
As previously noted, no CT effects were identified for Ghana and Niger, which motivated us
to look at the correlates with other indirect policy effects on food insecurity. For example, in
2004 Ghana introduced subsidies to compensate for higher liquid petroleum gas (LPG), petrol
and kerosene prices (Grosh et al., 2008). With an expenditure totalling about 2.2% of GDP, this
intervention probably had a significant influence on income and food security. Similarly, since 2005
the government of Niger has made cut-price cereals available to those who need help in recovering
from shortages in the previous years. This policy is aimed at combating the food insecurity caused
by primary commodity price increases, and is thus likely to be at least time-correlated with the
CT intervention.
The placebo tests (Figure 2) indicate that our results identify the causal effects of CT policies,
except for Burkina Faso. This exception is unsurprising because the policy introduced in Burk-
ina Faso was a pilot project targeted at orphans and other vulnerable children. It covered 3.250
randomly selected households with children under the age of 15. We speculate that the implemen-
tation of a main project, increasing the targeting, could determine a reduction of the impact on
food insecurity.
The results for the fragile state group are presented in panels q, r, s of Figure 1. The estimates
show that the PU trends for the synthetic Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe continued on their moderate
downward trajectories, whilst the real such trends underwent a sharper decline. In the post-
intervention period, we estimated a significant reduction in the prelevance of undernourishment
in these two countries. Finally, different from the previous group of countries, the placebo tests
for Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe present a less clear picture concerning interpretation of the causal
effects of CTs on PU. We recorded sharp PU reductions in the placebo estimations, although enough
was confounded by other trends. Hence caution must be exercised in estimating the magnitude of
the CT effects in these two countries.
Table 4 lists the PU estimates as variation in percentage points. The immediate effects of CT
policies on PU are given in bold, and the two last lines of Table 4 report the average effects after
two and three years, whereas the estimates for years after the third should be used with caution
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because they may be affected by the progressive importance of time correlate confounders.
Interestingly, the magnitude of the CT effects is strongly heterogeneous. CTs have had a large
effect on food insecurity in Rwanda and Malawi, which saw a reduction of between 1.8 and 4
percentage points (3-year mean value), whilst an intermediate effect of less than 1% (3-year mean
value) was realised in Ethiopia and Mali. With regard to to the low-income countries, we found
that CTs in Zimbabwe had larger effects on food insecurity than did those in Sierra Leone, where
the 3-year mean value of PU indicated only a half percentage point reduction.
Table 4: Cash transfer effects on prevalence of undernourishment
Year of the intervention Ethiopia Mali Malawi Rwanda Sierra Leone Zimbabwe
2000 - 0.550 - - - -
2001 - 0.782 - - - -
2002 - 0.939 - - - -
2003 - 1.281 - - - -
2004 - 2.050 0.268 - - 0.207
2005 0.053 3.026 1.710 - -0.266 1.182
2006 0.841 4.495 3.608 0.974 0.521 2.553
2007 1.917 5.836 5.262 3.604 1.435 4.551
2008 3.411 7.414 6.434 7.309 2.794 6.024
2009 5.329 8.659 6.923 11.881 4.849 7.587
2010 7.246 9.821 6.971 15.864 7.847 8.413
Average effect after 2 years 0.447 0.666 0.989 2.289 0,127 0.694
Average effect after 3 years 0.937 0.757 1.862 3.962 0.563 1.314
Notes: The yearly effects of policy introduction on the prevalence of undernourishment, along with the two and three
years averages, for each country. Both the synthetic control and real PU are given (see Figure 1).
3.2. Discussion and policy implications
Although our estimates provide no clear-cut lessons on the way in which CT implementation
in sub-Saharan Africa has influenced food security policy outcomes, we can infer that such inter-
ventions have positive effects in low-income and fragile state countries. The result obtained for
upper-middle income countries is instead more complex. The two upper-middle income countries
considered here, Lesotho and Swaziland, are not representative of upper-middle income countries as
a whole, although they are interesting for their specificity. Neither the universal Old Age Pension
introduced in Lesotho in 2005 to reduce the effects of primary commodity price increases on the
elderly nor the Old Age Grant for poor people over 60 introduced in Swaziland in 2005 had any ap-
preciable effect on food security. A possible explanation is that Lesotho, like most of upper-middle
income countries, has adopted a rights-based social protection system that covers a wide range
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of vulnerable groups and a significant proportion of the population. Thus, the implementation
of various social policies may conceal the positive influence of CTs on food security. In addition,
the rapid increase in food prices after 2005 resulted in reduced purchasing power for pensioners
and thus as CTs became inadequate to meet the nutritional needs of this group (Croome et al.,
2007). In Swaziland, in contrast, we have a counterintuitive result: after CT implementation, the
indicator of food insecurity increased. The explanation may lie in the food crisis that began to
unfold in 2005. In the wake of that crisis, CTs proved ineffective in Swaziland for two reasons:
their lack of universal coverage and the huge administrative problems associated with the old age
grant (e.g. high transfer and disbursement costs and fraud) (Garcia and Moore, 2012). Moreover,
Swaziland is a peculiar case facing a number of long-term systemic problems, including the inter-
action amongst food insecurity, HIV/AIDS and drought, which cannot be addressed by the CTs
in place (Masuku and Sithole, 2009). Further evaluation is necessary to reach firmer conclusions
concerning the upper-middle income countries of sub-Saharan Africa.
The success stories are focused on low-income and fragile state countries, in which CTs have
proved effective in enhancing food security. Although it must be stressed that this analysis omits the
transmission channel through which reductions in the prevalence of undernourishment is achieved,
we speculate that the drivers of CTs’ effects on food security improvements are linked with the
short-term response of food purchases made possible by changes in household income. In particular,
given that food is a luxury for a large proportion of the population in poor countries, the share of
food increases with additional income at low levels of total consumption distribution, an argument
largely discussed by Ibrahim et al. (2007) using the Ethiopian Urban Household Survey.
Addressed to a political perspective, we must also emphasise that, in all of these cases, the
CT programmes have been funded both by governments and foreign donors and administered by
government institutions, with the universal aim of reducing the socio economic vulnerability of a
large proportion of the population. In most of the cases, CTs have been part of the humanitarian
response to emergencies, following the human rights-based approach that considers humanitarian
assistance to be a right of the population affected (FAO, 2009; United Nations, 2009; Harvey et al.,
2010).
Ethiopia, Rwanda, Zimbabwe and Sierra Leone have experimented large-scale emergency as-
sistance programmes in response to crises. Unlike other emergency appeals, the programmes in
21
this countries are characterised by a long-term focus and integrated with a package of measures
designed to both ensure minimum subsistence and also offer opportunities to increase income
and assets (Devereux, 2012). In the case of Ethiopia (Productive Safety Net Programme-Direct
Support) and Zimbabwe (CTs, including the Protracted Relief Programme, Care for the Elderly,
Drought Relief, Support for Families in Distress) these programmes address natural and human-
caused disasters, including those that result from conflict, in addition to chronic food insecurity
and a lack of development (Be´ne´ et al., 2012; Jones et al., 2005) 11. Similarly, in Rwanda the Child
Soldiers Reintegration Grant is a short-term CT programme that addresses the post-conflict emer-
gency (it helps individuals to start new occupations in post-conflict contexts), whilst the Vision
2020 Umurenge Programme is a leading component of the country’s long-term National Economic
Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux (2011). The com-
prehensive approach to tackling food insecurity includes public works and low-interest loans for
land improvements as a pathway from food insecurity to food sufficiency (Devereux, 2012). Sierra
Leone’s CT schemes (the Old and Needy and Reinsertion Benefits) have been implemented in
the context of post-conflict recovery and with reference to the country’s IMF-mandated Poverty
Reduction Strategy Paper, which recommends the implementation of a social protection policy
that takes the form of short-to-medium-term programme linking access to social services and food
security (Holmes and Jackson, 2007). The beneficiaries are typically the elderly and those lacking
a stable income, in accordance with the strategic objective providing a social safety net to the
vulnerable and increasing social cohesiveness in the aftermath of the conflict.
Mali presents a different case. Its pilot programme, called Bourse Maman, which had limited
coverage and funding, had a significant effect on food security. It is interesting to note that this
programme, which was championed by UNICEF, focused on improving education and required
that the CT recipients be women (Holmes and Barrientos, 2009; Pereznieto, 2009). Similarly, the
successful CT pilot programme in Malawi (the Social Cash Transfer Programme, funded by the gov-
ernment and UNICEF) targets children’s school enrolment and attendance and provides transfers
to female household representatives (Miller et al., 2010, 2011)12. Our findings are also interesting
11Ethiopia’s CT scheme is complemented by a public works programme and a programme that promotes a combi-
nation of productivity-enhancing transfers or agricultural extension services, including subsidised credit, technology
transfers and community investments (Other Food Security Programme) (Gilligan et al., 2009; Sabates-Wheeler and
Devereux, 2010).
12Although limited in scale and duration, the humanitarian intervention during the food crises of 2005-2006, the
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because may represent a bridge with the CCTs focused on human capital investments and targeted
at women and children have sparked considerable attention for their role in combating hunger and
promoting nutrition security (Bassett, 2008; de Brauw and Hoddinott, 2011; Hoddinott and Bas-
sett, 2009; Hoddinott, 2010; Paes-Sousa et al., 2011). Whilst it remains open to question whether
CCT schemes are suitable in the context of low-incomes sub-Saharan African countries (Kakwani
et al., 2005; Schubert and Slater, 2006; Schu¨ring, 20102010a,2010b), our evaluation indicates that
CCTs may have positive effects on food security by improving a population’s nutritional status.
Consequently, our analysis supports Bassett’s call for sub-Saharan Africa to promote policies that
encourage groups at high risk of undernutrition (women and children) to utilise education and nu-
trition services, improve the quality of these services and prioritise nutrition-related conditionalities
based on best practices in nutrition (Bassett, 2008) .
Another common feature of all of the programmes that have had a positive and significant influ-
ence on food security is that they have been implemented with the involvement of local communi-
ties. The implication is that programmes built on participatory and community-driven approaches,
although controversial (World Bank, 2013), are more likely to be successful (Devereux, 2012). The
experience of Sierra Leone, whose CT programme began at the end of its long-running civil war
and was implemented following a bottom-up approach, shows that the institutional arrangements
(the institutional and political context) are also of paramount importance in determining the ef-
fects of CTs on food security (Devereux, 2009, 2012) which concurs with the views of Harvey and
Homes (2007), Holmes and Jackson (2007) and Slater (2009) that social policy in the post-conflict
context helps to provide an enabling environment for growth, bridging the gap between crisis and
development.
4. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we estimate the effects of CT policies on food insecurity in a sample of sub-
Saharan African countries. We study the prevalence of undernourishment patterns amongst the
Food and Cash Transfer (FACT) project, and the Dowa Emergency Cash Transfers (DECT) project implemented in
2006-2007 also generated positive effects in Malawi (Devereux et al., 2006). In this case, the transfers were index-
linked to local food prices, thus reducing their vulnerability to the price inflation that undermines purchasing power.
Moreover, in 2005 the government of Malawi introduced input subsidies (the Malawi Agricultural Input Subsidy
Programme), which boosted national maize production and dampened fluctuations in the market price of maize.
These interventions helped to increase food availability and reduce food insecurity (Devereux, 2012).
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fragile, low- and middle-upper income countries targeted by these policies and separately for each
country that has introduced such a policy. The availability of similar countries that have not
implemented a CT programme allows us to estimate the short-term effects of these policies under
a quasi-experimental framework.
The introduction of CTs programmes provides a useful test for the choice of food policies in
the sub-Saharan region. We find their introduction in low-income and fragile countries to lead to a
1-4 percentage points reduction in the prevalence of undernourishment over three years, although
these policies result in no significant improvements in food security in their upper-middle income
counterparts. Although correlates forces linked with institutions may affect the results of the CT
application on food insecurity, our results lead to conclude that CT policies are important where
is large the reaction in food consumption to impulses in available income, which reduces food
insecurity.
More work is needed in this field. In particular, because CT programmes place strong empha-
sis on nutrition, providing advices on best healthcare and nutrition practices, it is important to
determine whether they are having the desired effects also in these outcomes. It would be interest-
ing to repeat our analysis in assessing the effects of CCTs, because understanding the effects and
mechanisms of such programmes are also essential for the effective design and redesign of policy
interventions.
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